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Door to Mexican Energy
Opens Slowly
Despite NAFTA and the movement toward
economic integration in North America, the
Mexican energy door was tightly shut to foreign
participation until very recently. The tone was set
in 1938 by the Mexican expropriation of U.S. and
British oil companies and the creation of Pemex
as a state monopoly to control all aspects of the
Mexican oil and natural gas industry. In 1962, 
the Mexican government completed purchases of 
U.S. and Canadian electric power companies in
Mexico and widely advertised La Electricidad Es
Nuestra (The Electricity Is Ours). Foreign partici-
pation in energy remains a politically charged 
subject in Mexico—as dangerous to political
careers as talk of cutting entitlements or raising
taxes in the United States.
However, in the past two years, the Zedillo
administration has tested the limits of foreign 
participation by privatizing many petrochemicals
and has made meaningful progress in opening up
natural gas transmission, natural gas distribution
and electricity generation. The progress has been
slow at best, leaving some frustrating barriers still
in place, but for Houston energy companies, it 
is finally creating new and viable opportunities.
Recent Mexican energy projects have attracted
interest from many companies with local ties,
including Bechtel, Coastal, El Paso Energy, Enron,
Fluor Daniel, NorAm, Shell and the Williams Cos.
RESERVED TO THE STATE
In relations between the United States and
Mexico, it is commonly observed that the United
States often remembers too little of its history and
Mexico too much. The Mexican expropriation 
of U.S. and British oil in 1938 is an excellent
example. In retrospect, it was an episode with little to recommend the actions of either side.
The oil companies were guilty of disrespect 
for both their Mexican workers and Mexican
sovereignty. The Cárdenas administration was
guilty of using xenophobia to stir the public
and as a form of blackmail. The resulting rup-
ture led to the first large-scale expropriation
and nationalization of foreign oil assets and
caused widespread celebration throughout
Mexico in March 1938.
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) was immedi-
ately established as a state enterprise to control
the Mexican oil industry. Left with little equip-
ment and few administrative skills in 1938,
Pemex would eventually become a respected
model for Mexican public enterprise. Such
public enterprise seemed to harness best the
limited administrative skills of a developing
country and provided a training ground for 
future generations of engineers and adminis-
trators. The model was perfected during
1946–52 under Miguel Alemán, who brought
business efficiency to three great “decentral-
ized agencies” of the Mexican state—oil, elec-
tricity and railroads.
State enterprise was widely extended
through the Mexican economy in the 1950s
and 1960s, but economic reform in recent
years has largely focused on reversing this
trend and dismantling many of these com-
panies. Modern Mexico now has progressed
beyond the original rationale for state monop-
oly, and the government’s willingness to use
these firms as a piggybank became their chief
shortcoming—through heavy taxes, through
subsidies by underpricing public services and
for political payoffs to unions.
Since 1938, Pemex has consolidated its
grip on Mexican oil. The touchstone for the
1938 expropriation of U.S. and British oil 
concessions was Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution of 1917, a provision that re-
served the mineral wealth of Mexico to the
government. In its formative years, Pemex
experimented with risk-service contracts that
conveyed to foreign companies that provided
exploration capital a percentage of the value of
oil discovered. Since 1958, however, such 
risk-service contracts (and any other form of
participation agreement) have been forbidden
under amendments to Article 27; this is un-
likely to change because any implied or actual 
foreign control of Mexican oil is politically
unacceptable. Also, under 1958 legislation,
Pemex was given control of oil by-products
that are “potentially useful raw materials”—
that is, Mexican petrochemicals. A list of 16
basic petrochemicals controlled by Pemex was
published in 1960 and increased to 45 by 1967.
In 1971, these petrochemicals were reserved 
to the state under Article 27.
Meanwhile, the private capital of the inter-
national oil companies moved on to huge new
oil strikes in Venezuela, the Middle East and
other locations. The Mexican political problem
today is how to attract badly needed capital
back to the energy sector, when energy—and
especially oil—remains an emotional matter of
national pride. Pemex stands at the center of
the controversy, both as the key actor in
Mexican energy and the chief heir of the oil
mystique in Mexico.
CLOSE TO PEMEX
Pemex interacts widely with foreign com-
panies through its suppliers of oil services and
machinery. It is in the early phases of two 
massive exploration and development projects:
one in the Burgos gas fields in northeast
Mexico, a geological extension of the South
Texas fields, and the other a modernization of
its super-giant Cantarell field in offshore
Campeche. As the contracts are leased for the
projects, foreign suppliers become involved—
Schlumberger, Halliburton, Cooper Cameron,
Western Geophysical and Owen Oil Tools,
among others.
Privatization of nonbasic or secondary
petrochemicals is under way in Mexico, but
recent efforts to privatize existing Pemex 
petrochemical facilities have led to a series 
of false starts. The Salinas administration set
the stage by reducing the number of state-
reserved petrochemicals (which had grown to
70) to 34 in 1986 and to 20 in 1989. The cur-
rent list includes only nine basic feedstocks.
One hundred percent private participation,
including foreign, is now allowed for petro-
chemicals falling outside the basic list. A 
private $3 billion petrochemical complex is
being promoted at Altamira on the Gulf 
Coast, with 17 companies investing. Future
investment should grow with port privatization
and a possible connection to the U.S. intra-
coastal waterway.
In October 1995, the Zedillo administration
announced the controversial sale of all 10
Pemex secondary petrochemical complexes,61 different plants possibly worth $2.5 billion.
However, Pemex unions and other political
opposition proved too strong by mid-1996, and
the energy ministry returned to the drawing
board. The current plan is to offer 49 percent
shares in 10 newly created Pemex subsidiaries,
and even this less-than-halfway approach
seems to be on hold until after Mexico’s mid-
term elections in July.
NATURAL GAS
In 1995, Article 27 was amended to allow
private investors to construct, own and operate
natural gas pipelines, storage and distribution
systems in Mexico. Pemex will remain the only
producer and will retain its trunkline system
under open access regulation. Other gas trans-
porters can build and operate new pipelines.
Pemex will withdraw from natural gas distri-
bution in favor of the private sector, and gas
storage and marketers ultimately will evolve as
the system becomes more sophisticated.
Three permits have been approved so far
for gas transportation. Mid-Con applied to
build a 102-mile natural gas pipeline from
Rome, Texas, to Monterrey. A second project
will carry gas 330 miles to the Mérida III power
project in the Yucatán. A third project will carry
gas 25 miles to the Salamayuca II power plant
near Juárez. In addition, seven permits have
been approved for individual companies to
provide their own supplies of natural gas
through a combination of open access and pri-
vate pipelines.
There has been strong interest in the first
franchises for local natural gas distribution to
be offered by Mexico’s Energy Regulatory
Commission. Consortia of foreign investors
have won the first distribution tenders offered
in Chihuahua, Hermosillo and Mexicali. They
received a 12-year monopoly, and in exchange,
they will buy existing Pemex infrastructure and
commit to specific levels of investment. The
Toluca and Tampico/Altamira regions have
been tendered but not awarded, and Mexico
City may be offered as several zones.
Two big pricing problems regarding
Mexican natural gas are evident. One is a 6
percent Mexican tariff on imports of natural
gas, a post-NAFTA relic that is delaying several
cross-border transportation projects. The sec-
ond is a heavy Pemex subsidy for LPG. Instead
of using natural gas, 97 percent of Mexican
consumers rely on subsidized and dirty-
burning LPG for cooking and heating. These
subsidies must be reduced to induce house-
holds to switch to natural gas.
ELECTRICITY
In 1992, Mexico authorized independent
power projects (IPPs) that could be built by
Mexican businesses for exclusive sales of elec-
tricity to the Mexican power monopoly, the
Federal Power Commission (CFE is its acronym
in Spanish). Under NAFTA rules, U.S. or
Canadian firms can similarly enter into such
projects. In addition, the law allows foreign
investors to own and operate a cogeneration
facility for self-supply of electricity, providing
power for their own facilities and selling
excess to the CFE.
Both IPP and cogeneration started slowly,
but finally made significant progress last year.
Details have been worked out for construction
of the Mérida III generator, an IPP project won
by a Japanese–U.S.–Mexican consortium to
bring power to the Yucatán. It represented a
test of investor interest and required the suc-
cess of a separately tendered pipeline project.
It left the winner’s profit margins squeezed
firmly between Mexico’s energy monopolies—
buying all gas from Pemex and selling output
for 28 years to the CFE. The head of CFE
recently stated that, based on Mérida III, the
IPP would be the vehicle of choice for similar
large power generators, as foreign investors
brought state-of-the-art technology, had attrac-
tive financing and offered low long-term
power rates.
Cogeneration also started slowly, but
gained momentum last year. Three large pro-
jects were given permits by mid-year: the first
to a group of Monterrey companies, the sec-
ond to several plants belonging to cement-
producer Cemex and the third to a group of
companies in Altamira. By the end of last year,
25 self-supply contracts that totaled 1,900 MWe
had been published. The current waiting list
for CFE approval is 1,400 MWe.
Current electricity pricing deters faster
progress. Mexican power rates may be the
lowest in the world, with subsidies that cost
the Mexican government more than $20 billion
in 1996. This presents a significant barrier to
cogenerators that sell into the grid at subsi-
dized tariffs. Industry pays approximately 80
percent of its cost of electric service, and resi-
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Employment figures released by the
Texas Workforce Commission show that
Houston’s job growth is slowing. Over the past
12 months, wage and salary jobs have
increased only 1.9 percent, and job growth
from October to April slowed to an annual rate
near 1 percent. The service sector and govern-
ment have been the main source of job growth
during the past six months. In contrast, Beige
Book respondents remain upbeat about cur-
rent conditions.
RETAIL TRADE AND AUTOS
Retailers reported a good May, and they
continue to be ahead of planned sales. Retail
business has been good all year, and current
inventories are in good shape going into the
summer season. The two biggest problems are
finding workers at the bottom of the labor pool
and continued losses from credit cards.
April auto and truck sales were up nearly
5 percent from April 1996. For the first four
months of 1997, Houston’s auto sales increased
approximately 2 percent. This reflects a solid
performance, given that 1996 was a strong year
for Houston auto sales.
ENERGY PRICES
Crude oil prices were between $19 and $20
for most of April and then increased to just
over $20 per barrel during May. May prices were
helped by international tension in several key
producing areas and strong gasoline demand.
Late spring cold weather helped both nat-
ural gas and heating oil prices. Reversing nor-
mal seasonal trends, heating oil rose steadily
from early April to late May, as unexpected
heating loads kept prices rising. Natural gas
prices similarly were pushed back over $2 per
thousand cubic feet in mid-April and remained
there through May. Natural gas storage was
only 38 percent full at the end of May, so stor-
age refills should be a positive factor for gas
prices through the summer.
REFINING
Refineries switched to gasoline production
later than usual, and capacity utilization briefly
slipped below 90 percent. Concerns about low
gasoline inventories proved unfounded, how-
ever, because supplies were adequate for the
Memorial Day kickoff of the summer driving
season. Refiners have earned respectable mar-
gins all year, and May continued this trend.
PETROCHEMICALS
Petrochemical demand remains strong and
margins are healthy for most products. Prices
of many basic petrochemicals rose along with
energy prices over the winter and did not
decline as natural gas and gas liquids prices
began to fall back to current levels. Prices of
polyethylene for packaging and polyvinyl
chloride for construction rose in April and May.
However, new ethylene capacity coming on-
line over the summer will put downward pres-
sure on the prices of these and other products
and will quickly erase the gains.
OIL SERVICES AND MACHINERY
The oil service and machinery industry
continues to see very strong demand and is
operating flat out. Energy prices are strong
enough to offer oil producers tremendous rates
of return, thus providing the cash flow needed
to reinvest the money in the business through
drilling. Reports persist of shortages of machin-
ists, ship captains and crews, drilling crews,
drill pipe and many types of equipment.
REAL ESTATE
The single-family market remains solid,
with strong sales of new homes. Housing starts
lag last year because of wet weather, and most
builders have an inventory of sold but uncom-
pleted homes because they can’t pour the
foundations.
The apartment market is reported to be in
balance, with the possible exception of too
many Class A apartment projects under way.
The industrial market is the strongest real
estate market in Houston, with 5 million square
feet built last year and another 5 million
expected this year.